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From e Bag
William Wirt  the Invention of 
the Public Lawyer
H. JeÖerson Powell
n a habeas corpus case he decided in
1919, the distinguished federal judge
Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., quoted at
length from a century-old memorandum writ-
ten by Attorney General William Wirt.
Hutcheson used Wirt’s “able and exhaustive
opinion” to establish the proposition that only
an express statement by Congress justiÕes the
conclusion that the legislature has deprived
members of the armed services of the right of
trial by jury. In Hutcheson’s view, Wirt’s opin-
ion was legally sound and displayed Wirt’s
legal erudition in a manner “characteristic of
that great and able lawyer.”1
A well-known jurist who served on the
bench for half a century,2 Hutcheson is now
remembered for a single piece of writing, an
essay he published in 1929 entitled “The Judg-
ment Intuitive: The Function of the ‘Hunch’
in Judicial Decision.” In that essay Hutcheson
gave an arresting, and controversial, descrip-
tion of how he decided cases that are “diÓcult
or involved [or that] turn upon a hairsbreadth
of law or of fact”:
I, after canvassing all the available material at
my command, and duly cogitating upon it, give
my imagination play, and brooding over the
cause, wait for the feeling, the hunch – that
intuitive Ôash of understanding which makes
the jump-spark connection between question
1 Ex parte Jochen, 257 F. 200, 203 (S.D. Tex. 1919), quoting Cadets at West Point, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 276
(1819).
JeÖ Powell is a Professor of Law at Duke University School of Law.
2 Hutcheson was United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas (1918-1930), and a
member of the Fifth Circuit (1930-1968; Chief Judge 1948-1959). Among his extrajudicial writings
were the William H. White Lectures he gave in 1936 at the University of Virginia, published as Law
as Liberator (1937), and a set of occasional pieces that he collected under the title Judgment Intuitive
(1938). See also the recent study of Hutcheson by Professor Charles L. Zeldon, “The Judge
Intuitive: The Life and Judicial Philosophy of Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr.,” 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 905
(1998).
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and decision, and at the point where the path
is darkest for the judicial feet, sheds its light
along the way.3
The doctrinal and logical arguments laid out
in the opinion announcing his decision were,
Hutcheson explained, an after the fact expla-
nation. “And more,” Hutcheson continued,
“‘lest I be stoned in the street’ for this admis-
sion, let me hasten to say to my brothers of the
Bench and of the Bar, ‘my practice is therein
the same with that of your other worships.’”4
Intuition and imagination are “essential,”
according to Hutcheson, “to great advocacy
and great judging.”5
To Hutcheson himself, emphasizing the
intuitive element in legal thought entailed no
denial of the value of legal reasoning; his aim
instead was to identify the proper relationship
between technical reasoning and the pursuit of
substantive justice that Hutcheson believed to
be the ultimate goal of law.6 Hutcheson’s admi-
ration for Wirt’s extensive knowledge of law
thus involved no paradox or self-contradiction:
for Hutcheson, Wirt’s erudition and his deeply
imaginative and emotional nature were both
crucial elements of what made Wirt a “great
and able lawyer.”
For Wirt himself, in contrast, it was much
less obvious that the head and the heart can be
partners in creating greatness in the law, and
the resulting tension is one of the many
aspects of Wirt’s life that are captured in min-
iature in Henry Dowling’s 1898 sketch of Wirt.
Thanks to the Green Bag, Dowling’s revealing
essay is now readily available to a new genera-
tion of lawyers who, like Wirt, confront the
question of how to relate reason and imagina-
tion, thought and emotion, in the practice of
law.7
As Dowling at various points intimates,
Wirt stood at the intersection of a number of
cross-cutting forces in the development of
American law and American society more
generally. In a recent and important study of
Wirt’s personal life, Professor Anya Jabour
has situated his marriage to Elizabeth
Gamble in the context of a complex and self-
contradictory image of marriage widely held
in the early nineteenth century.8 Like many of
their contemporaries, Elizabeth and William
Wirt strove to combine an ideal of marriage
as a relationship between aÖectionate and
essentially equal companions with an increas-
ingly rigid deÕnition of the roles of men and
women in society. Wirt’s professional and
public life was similarly conÔicted. He was a
leading member of the Õrst generation of
American lawyers whose experience of the
profession was entirely shaped by the culture
and politics of the post-Revolutionary
Republic. As a consequence, Wirt came to
experience the law as primarily a means of
making a living, often a demanding and
tedious one, that was usually divorced from
the great moral and political issues which he
saw as the focus of his professional predeces-
sors. Politics, on the other hand, recurrently
tempted Wirt throughout his adult life as an
avenue to the greatness that he saw and
admired in Õgures such as JeÖerson, Madison
and Monroe; but just as recurrently, involve-
ment in public aÖairs (other than litigation)
provoked in Wirt a swift recoil from what he
saw as the tawdriness and bitter partisanship
3 14 Cornell L.Q. 274, 278 (1929). 
4 Id. The quotations are from Rabelais’s Gargantua and Pantagruel, Book III, c. 39.
5 14 Cornell L.Q. at 288.
6 See, e.g., his address to the 1932 annual meeting of the American Law Institute, “Lawyer’s Law, and
the Little, Small Dice,” 7 Tulane L. Rev. 1 (1932).
7 See Henry M. Dowling, “William Wirt,” 10 Green Bag 453 (1898), reprinted below at pages 303-10.
8 See Anya Jabour, Marriage in the Early Republic: Elizabeth and William Wirt and the Companionate Ideal
(1998).
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of early nineteenth-century politics.
For Wirt, President James Monroe’s oÖer
of the oÓce of Attorney General of the United
States presented an opportunity to reconcile
his clashing interests. The position would lift
him at once to the forefront of the national bar
while providing his family with
Õnancial security. (In the early
Republic, the position was viewed
as part-time, and Attorneys Gen-
eral were expected to maintain a
private practice: “I have no doubt
of bettering the situation of our
dear children by the move,” he
wrote his wife.9) Furthermore,
unlike electoral politics, service as
Attorney General would not
embroil Wirt in the brutal parti-
san battles that he found so per-
sonally repugnant. ( Janet Reno
and John Ashcroft might well
envy Wirt in that regard.) It was
with high hopes, therefore, that
Wirt took on the position, in
which he served longer than any
other incumbent before or since,
from 1817 until 1829.
Wirt’s aspirations were fulÕlled
only in part. The position of
Attorney General, he quickly dis-
covered, was no sinecure, at least
if it was to be carried out as he
thought it should. And therein lay
his greatest burden, for his predecessors evi-
dently had not viewed the oÓce in the same
light as Wirt. “[W]hen I had the honor of
receiving the appointment,” he wrote the
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
a few months later, “I asked for the docu-
ments belonging to the oÓce … but my
inquiries resulted in the discovery that there
was not to be found … any trace of a pen indi-
cating, in the slightest manner, any one act of
advice or opinion which had been given by
any one of my predecessors, from the Õrst
foundation of the federal government to the
moment of my inquiry.”10 Wirt found himself
essentially creating from whole cloth the oÓce
of Attorney General as an ongoing branch of
the government. Between establishing a sys-
tem of records, regularizing the relationship
of the Attorney General to other oÓcials and
to the public at large, representing the United
States in the Supreme Court (which was one
of his two statutory duties, the other being to
9 William Wirt to Elizabeth Wirt (Nov. 13, 1817), in 2 John P. Kennedy, Memoirs of the Life of William
Wirt, Attorney General of the United States (1849) 32.
10 William Wirt to Hugh Nelson (Mar. 27, 1818), in 2 Kennedy, at 61.
William Wirt
Frontispiece, 1 John P. Kennedy, Memoirs of the Life of 
William Wirt, Attorney General of the United States (1849).
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render opinions to executive oÓcers) and in
the lower federal courts (which was not part
of his oÓcial job, and for which he was rec-
ompensed specially) as well as representing
other clients, and rendering a body of opin-
ions that today occupy roughly seven hundred
pages in the oÓcial Opinions of the Attorneys
General, Wirt was very busy indeed. 
The consequences for Wirt’s personal life
were severe: adopting a phrase that in various
forms Elizabeth Wirt used several times in
correspondence, Professor Jabour refers to the
Wirts’ relationship in this period as one of “an
almost complete divorce.” Jabour’s research
makes it plain that Wirt’s preoccupation with
his career subjected his marriage and his family
to extraordinary stress: the Õve years he lived
after leaving oÓce were largely devoted to what
was in eÖect a reconciliation with Elizabeth.
Furthermore, as Dowling correctly indicates,
the fame for which Wirt sacriÕced so much
time and energy proved ephemeral: despite his
historical signiÕcance, Wirt has no place in
twenty-Õrst-century Americans’ general pic-
ture of our past, and scarcely any greater prom-
inence among contemporary lawyers. That is a
matter for regret, and not merely because we
know that it would disappoint Wirt: both in
his life and through his legal views Wirt helped
to create the legal universe in which we still
live. By considering Wirt’s problems, successes
and failures, we can gain perspective on
twenty-Õrst-century American law both as a
system of thought and as a mode of human
endeavor. 
Consider the relationship between reason-
ing and intuition with which I began. Unlike
Judge Hutcheson, Wirt saw a sharp distinction
between these two modes of thought and deci-
sion and (unhappily) believed that the law
required the exaltation of reason and research
at the expense of imagination and emotion.
The realization, as Wirt saw it, that his chosen
profession demanded the suppression pro tanto
of his literary and imaginative impulses came
early: in a letter written in 1806 he described a
conversation in which he had criticized himself
for “laxity of intellect,” by which he meant his
tendency to follow many diÖerent ideas rather
than stick to a precise line of argument. The
person to whom he was speaking
doubted whether [this tendency] ought to be
lamented as a defect, suggesting that the man
in whose imagination these meteors were
always shooting, bid much fairer both for fame
and fortune than the dry and rigid logician,
however close and cogent.
Not for a lawyer, Wirt replied, for there the
model 
is John Marshall, whose mind seems to be
little else than a mountain of barren and
stupendous rocks, an inexhaustible quarry
from which he draws his materials and builds
his fabrics, rude and Gothic … a fellow who
would not turn oÖ a single step from the right
line of his argument though a Paradise should
rise to tempt him … yet who, all dry and rigid
as he is, has acquired all the wealth, fame and
honor that a man need to desire. There is no
theorizing against facts: Marshall’s certainly is
the true road to solid and lasting reputation in
courts of law.11
Years later, at the height of his professional
career, Wirt held to this view and to the self-
castigation and contradiction it stirred in his
highly intuitive and emotional character. For
instance, in an 1824 letter Wirt recounted a
11 William Wirt to Benjamin Edwards (May 6, 1806), in 1 Kennedy, at 145-46. Dowling quotes this
letter in part without (I think) fully perceiving how ambivalent Wirt was about the character he was
“eulogiz[ing].” For Wirt, Marshall’s dry logic was indeed “the only true method” for success in
appellate-court practice, but that did not endear it to his heart: “If I had my choice,” he admitted, “I
would much rather have my son a Mirabeau [a French statesman famous for his passionate
eloquence] than a Marshall.” Id. I leave to one side for present purposes the question of whether
Wirt was altogether fair to Marshall in this character sketch.
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conversation with John C. Calhoun (then
Secretary of War) in which Calhoun urged
him “to study less and trust more to genius.”
While Wirt conceded the advice “may do very
well in politics,” he thought it inapposite to
the law, where “the labor of the profession” lies
in activities that Wirt himself often found
tedious drudgery.12
Contemporary American law, I suggest, is at
least as reÔective of the split between head and
heart that Wirt experienced as it is of
Hutcheson’s proposed reconciliation of the
two. The current high reputation of the second
Justice Harlan is a good example. A great many
academic lawyers and judges purport to admire
him greatly despite or rather because of his
perceived willingness to cast his votes in accord
with the dictates of precise, even technical legal
reasoning even in diÓcult constitutional cases.
At the same time a great many academic
lawyers (expressly) and judges (implicitly)
reject as self-defeating and even naive such an
approach to judging. Unlike Wirt, we tend to
be unsure about how to evaluate the relative
contributions of head and heart (Holmes’s
famous logic and experience) to law; like him,
we suÖer from their separation.
Wirt’s personal life also seems eerily similar
to that of many contemporary lawyers. For
most of his professional career, Wirt worked
long and hard hours that took a toll on his
health and his relationships. Financial worries,
the need to take just one more case to bolster
his income, loomed large for him. His corre-
spondence is full of laments over the combina-
tion of drudgery and anxiety that law often
posed for him, but at the same time it is clear
that he took great pleasure in his professional
accomplishments. The law, and his success as
a lawyer, were central to Wirt’s self-image and
self-esteem even as he told himself that he
valued other matters (family, marital love,
religious faith) far more. The practicing bar of
the early twenty-Õrst century is notoriously
riddled with dissatisÕed, unhappy men and
women: in William Wirt we see the origins of
some of that unhappiness.
As Dowling amply shows, however, Wirt’s
natural disposition was aÓrmative and play-
ful. He was an aÖectionate, empathetic and
sociable person who prized the creation and
maintenance of warm human relationships.
Wirt’s inability to undertake sustained politi-
cal activity was in large measure due to his
deep dislike of personal conÔict and animosity.
At the bar, in contrast, Wirt usually found it
possible to remain on friendly terms even with
lawyers against whom he litigated; his unusu-
ally prickly relationship with the distinguished
lawyer and former Attorney General William
Pinkney, which at one point almost led to a
duel, probably stemmed from Wirt’s sense
that Pinkney allowed professional controversy
to spill over into personal intercourse.
Wirt’s amiable personality inÔuenced his
understanding of the substance of law in ways
that he himself, with his Õrm distinction
between reason and imagination, probably
did not recognize. Wirt began his public
career during the administration of John
Adams, a period racked with disagreement
between Federalists and Republicans, in
which the law, and especially the fundamen-
tal law of the Constitution, functioned more
to divide than to unite. Wirt’s Õrst important
appearance on a public stage was as one of the
Republican defense counsel in United States v.
Callender, a prosecution under the notorious
Sedition Act of 1798.13 After repeatedly wran-
gling with Justice Samuel Chase over the
power of the jury to consider the question of
the Sedition Act’s constitutionality, Wirt and
the two other defense attorneys dramatically
picked up their papers and walked out of
12 See, e.g., William Wirt to Dabney Carr (Feb. 1, 1824), in 2 Kennedy, at 164.
13 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800).
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court, incidentally leaving the defendant to
the mercy of Chase and the jury, which
promptly convicted him. Wirt’s nineteenth-
century biographer interpreted his behavior
in Callender as a deliberate attempt to incite
the jury against Federalist Justice Chase and
so obtain the defendant’s acquittal by a
“theatrical incident”: at that time Wirt, like
many others on both sides of the partisan
divide, saw the law as a weapon to be used
without excessive nicety or concern for the
consequences of doing so.14 As time went on,
however, Wirt found this instrumental
understanding of law, and especially of the
Constitution, increasingly unattractive. 
Wirt’s mature view of the role of law in
American society is encapsulated in a letter he
wrote to President Monroe in 1823, urging that
the Republican Monroe consider appointing
the distinguished New York judge – and well-
known Federalist – James Kent to the United
States Supreme Court. Wirt conceded that
Kent’s appointment “would, at Õrst, produce
considerable excitement” (by which he plainly
meant protest by Republicans oÖended at the
choice of a Federalist) but argued that the
short-term cost was far outweighed by the
long-term advantage to the nation of appoint-
ing a judge of Kent’s stature and character to
the high Court. “The Constitution is the pub-
lic property of the United States,” Wirt
reminded Monroe, not the instrument of a
political faction, and in addressing issues of
constitutional moment “a President of the
United States should look to the good of the
whole country, to their great and permanent
interests.”15 This concern for the law as a means
of expressing and safeguarding political com-
munity pervades Wirt’s legal opinions as
Attorney General as well and distinguishes his
understanding of public law from the more
adversarial views that seem predominant today.
William Wirt’s bid for lasting fame failed,
at least in the most obvious sense. For the
reasons I have suggested, I think there are
good reasons to revisit Wirt’s life and career,
not necessarily to marvel at him (although
my own sense is that he was, as Dowling
says, a lovable if also Ôawed human being)
but to learn from him and his experience.
There is little currently in print that makes
that possible,16 and for that reason I wel-
come the Green Bag’s republication of Henry
Dowling’s proÕle of Wirt.

14 1 Kennedy, at 80. 
15 William Wirt to James Monroe (May 5, 1823), in 2 Kennedy, at 153, 154. Monroe ultimately
appointed his Secretary of the Navy, Smith Thompson, a prominent New York Republican (and
former student of Kent) who Wirt agreed would be the least controversial choice.
16 Kennedy’s 1849 Life is, within the limits of the nineteenth-century life and letters genre, an excellent
(if opinionated) book, but it is long out of print. Gregory K. Glassner has recently published a brief
popular biography of Wirt, see Glassner, Adopted Son: The Life, Wit & Wisdom of William Wirt, 1772-
1834 (1997), and I have already mentioned Anya Jabour’s Õne book. Wirt’s own 1803 bestseller, The
Letters of the British Spy, is also available in a photographic facsimile of a later edition. I am currently
engaged in preparing a biography of Wirt.
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